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ABSTRACT: How should legislators write a law regulating a brand-new technology 
that they may not yet fully understand? With the advent of blockchain and other advanced 
computational technologies, this generation of legislators faces more complex questions 
than their predecessors.  
 Drawing on the author’s experience as a member of California’s Blockchain Work-
ing Group, this Article offers guidance to lawmakers, lawyers, and industry leaders seek-
ing to draft effective laws regulating real-life applications of blockchain technology. This 
cutting-edge Article will do two things for its readers: (1) encourage them to be informed 
participants in conversations relating to federal and state blockchain regulation, and (2) 
offer a snapshot of these regulatory processes early in the development of blockchain 
technology, which will prove to be useful in coming years. Blockchain technology and 
its applications will continue developing quickly, regardless of how governments frame 
regulation. Everyone—including industry players, members of the public, and govern-
ments themselves—will benefit if lawmakers can strike the right balance between inno-
vation and public protection. 
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 How should legislators write a law regulating applications of a brand-new 
technology, one that they may not yet fully understand? Past generations of leg-
islators faced this conundrum in the context of telephones and the internet.1 With 
the advent of blockchain and other advanced computational technologies, this 
generation of legislators faces more complex questions than their predecessors.2 
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 1. See generally EV EHRLICH, PROGRESSIVE POL’Y INST., A BRIEF HISTORY OF INTERNET 
REGULATION (2014), https://www.progressivepolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/2014.03-Ehr 
lich_A-Brief-History-of-Internet-Regulation.pdf [https://perma.cc/RZ93-T2NL] (discussing the 30-
year history of internet regulation). 
 2. See Why Blockchain Is Growing Faster than the Internet, TELEGRAPH (Nov. 23, 2018, 3:45 
PM), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/money/cryptocurrency-explained/blockchain-growing-faster-tha 
n-internet/ [https://perma.cc/GE75-JGL7] (advertising feature from eToro) (“In only 10 years of 
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Blockchain technology is moving quickly, and federal and state legislators are 
struggling to effectively write laws balancing the promotion of innovation and 
the protection of public interests. 
 Blockchain technology’s potential applications reach far and wide, with use 
cases developing in both the public and private sector.3 A blockchain is a dis-
tributed ledger, providing a record of transactions that is both distributed and 
nearly immutable.4 These two fundamental characteristics of blockchain are 
both simple and revolutionary. The distributed nature of a blockchain ledger 
means no central point of failure exists.5 This leads to a system without the tra-
ditional need for trusted third parties, since “a person can trust the validity of 
transactions without needing to rely on the integrity of intermediaries such as 
banks or governments.”6  
 A blockchain ledger is practically immutable, meaning that once a transac-
tion is written into the blockchain, it is computationally impractical to reverse 
that record.7 This is the real power of distributed ledger technology, as it does 
not require third party verification to ensure that ledgers cannot be changed or 
manipulated.8  
 Blockchains can exist in many variations, with different purposes and dif-
ferent technical attributes and governance. Permissionless blockchains are fully 
open, with anyone in the world able to participate.9 Permissioned blockchains, 
such as those used by financial institutions, restrict participation to those who 
are authorized to participate.10 The public may or may not be able to read infor-
mation on permissioned blockchains, depending on the organization’s prefer-
ence.11 Consortium blockchains lie in the middle; they can be created by a group 
                                                                                                                               
existence, [blockchain’s speed of development] is at the level that the internet was after 35 or so 
years.”). 
 3. A “use case” is a practical application of the technology. Use Case, TECHOPEDIA, https:// 
www.techopedia.com/definition/25813/use-case [https://perma.cc/A35T-SVFR]; see also Use 
Cases, USABILITY.GOV, https://www.usability.gov/how-to-and-tools/methods/use-cases.html [https:// 
www.usability.gov/how-to-and-tools/methods/use-cases.html]. For examples, see CAL. BLOCKCHAIN 
WORKING GRP., BLOCKCHAIN IN CALIFORNIA: A ROADMAP 14 (2020), https://www.govops.ca.gov/ 
wp-content/uploads/sites/11/2020/07/BWG-Final-Report-2020-July1.pdf. 
 4. Id. at 36. 
 5. Why Blockchain Is Perfect for Securing Our Expanding Online World, MEDIUM (Feb. 9, 
2018), https://medium.com/polyswarm/why-blockchain-is-perfect-for-securing-our-expanding-onl 
ine-world-971101ca7991 [https://perma.cc/GCF6-JNGH]. 
 6. Michele Benedetto Neitz, The Influencers: Facebook’s Libra, Public Blockchains, and the 
Ethical Considerations of Centralization, 21 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 41, 47 (2019) (citing Kevin Werbach, 
Trust, but Verify: Why Blockchain Needs the Law, 33 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 489, 528–29 (2018)). 
 7. CAL. BLOCKCHAIN WORKING GRP., supra note 3, at 50. 
 8. See id. 
 9. Permissionless blockchains are also called “public” blockchains. Bitcoin’s blockchain is 
the most famous example. See Carla L. Reyes, Conceptualizing Cryptolaw, 96 NEB. L. REV. 384, 
390–91 n. 29 (2017) (Permissionless blockchains are “open-source . . . generally public ledgers, 
open for anyone to inspect,” while permissioned blockchains “are developed and used on a propri-
etary basis and are often not public.”). 
 10. Vitalik Buterin, On Public and Private Blockchains, ETHEREUM BLOG (Aug. 7, 2015), https: 
//blog.ethereum.org/2015/08/07/on-public-and-private-blockchains/ [https://perma.cc/4ZP3-Q957].  
 11. See id.  
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of administrators with varying levels of participation and read access, and can 
be considered “partially” decentralized.12 
 Most observers first heard of blockchain technology as it relates to virtual 
currency, such as Bitcoin.13 This is the first and most ubiquitous use case for 
this technology. But numerous other use cases are developing as blockchain 
technology becomes more sophisticated. For example, blockchain is being used 
in industries as diverse as refugee services,14 real estate titles,15 retail supply 
chains,16 and even in the fight against the COVID-19 pandemic.17 While Bitcoin 
may still be the most famous blockchain use case, blockchain actually has the 
potential to revolutionize many aspects of daily life.18 Governments are adopt-
ing blockchain technology to streamline their operations, entrepreneurs are ex-
perimenting with blockchain technology in a wide variety of areas, and 
corporate organizations are “more committed than ever to blockchain” as they 
implement it throughout the business sector.19 For this reason, jurisdictions 
throughout the world are seeking a way to regulate this new and complicated 
subject.20  
 Drawing on the author’s experience as a member of California’s Block-
chain Working Group, this Article offers guidance to lawmakers, lawyers, and 
                                                                                                                               
 12. Id. Hyperledger is an example of a successful consortium blockchain. See HYPERLEDGER.ORG, 
https://www.hyperledger.org/ [https://perma.cc/KTA2-X8UX]. 
 13. See James J. Park & Howard H. Park, Regulation by Selective Enforcement: The SEC and 
Initial Coin Offerings, 61 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 99, 106 (2020). 
 14. See, e.g., Jessi Hempel, How Refugees Are Helping Create Blockchain's Brand New 
World, WIRED (Mar. 14, 2018, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/refugees-but-on-the-block 
chain/ [https://perma.cc/A48X-RZF4]. 
 15. See, e.g., Wes Williams et al., TitleToken: The Transformation of Title Insurance: How 
Blockchain Technology and Tokenization Will Change the Business of Title Insurance in the Future, 
MEDIUM (June 12, 2019), https://medium.com/@ubitquity/the-transformation-of-title-insurance-
ec081e9895b2 [https://perma.cc/DT28-5JAC]. 
 16. See, e.g., Vishal Gaur & Abhinav Gaiha, Building a Transparent Supply Chain, HARV. 
BUS. REV. (May–June 2020), https://hbr.org/2020/05/building-a-transparent-supply-chain [https:// 
perma.cc/GF3W-EA33]. 
 17. See, e.g., Oluwatobi Joel, How Blockchain Technology Can Help Fighting Against 
COVID-19, COINTELEGRAPH (June 7, 2020), https://cointelegraph.com/news/how-blockchain-tech 
nology-can-help-fighting-against-covid-19 [https://perma.cc/ECC8-8T29]. 
 18. For example, the California Blockchain Working Group examined blockchain applications 
in the following areas: vital records, health records, supply chain, property, utilities and natural re-
sources, finance, payments, commercial business, civic participation, and education and workforce. 
CAL. BLOCKCHAIN WORKING GRP., supra note 3, at 6–11.  
 19. DELOITTE, DELOITTE’S 2020 GLOBAL BLOCKCHAIN SURVEY: FROM PROMISE TO REALITY 
2 (2020), https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/insights/us/articles/6608_2020-global-blockchain-
survey/DI_CIR%202020%20global%20blockchain%20survey.pdf. 
 20. While this Article focuses on regulation in the United States, it is worth noting that some 
observers believe a global regulatory framework would be more effective. One CTO of a blockchain 
company recently argued that “since blockchain assets are truly global assets, they need a global 
regulatory standard and not a jurisdictional standard.” Craig Adeyanju, Ball’s in Their Court: Crypto 








188 61 JURIMETRICS 
industry leaders seeking to draft effective laws regulating applications of block-
chain technology. The Article focuses on regulation of financial assets created 
by or facilitated by blockchains, including cryptocurrencies and other types of 
digital assets. 
 Part I explains why blockchain and crypto-related laws are necessary but 
also more difficult to draft and pass than laws regulating less technical indus-
tries. Blockchain’s use cases, especially digital assets, present regulatory chal-
lenges because of their fast pace of development and high learning curve; 
indeed, it is hard to determine where oversight should exist for something that 
does not even have a common legislative definition. Part II recommends five 
factors state and federal legislators should consider as they embark on drafting 
or amending these laws, including (1) policy decisions, (2) ethical considera-
tions, (3) transparency, (4) interjurisdictional competition, and (5) uniformity. 
 Part III then considers whether these factors exist in current legislative ef-
forts by summarizing the existing federal statutory and regulatory structure. This 
Part uses the Cryptocurrency Act of 2020,21 a federal bill proposed in early 
2020, as a case study in legislative failure.  
 Part IV turns the lens to state legislative efforts. Using Aesop’s fable, “The 
Hare and the Tortoise” as an analogy, this Part analyzes methods used by three 
states who were among the first to regulate blockchain technology in the United 
States: California (the “tortoise” approach), Wyoming (the “hare” approach), 
and New York (the “boomerang” approach). Regardless of a jurisdiction’s ulti-
mate approach to regulation, blockchain laws and regulations must be dynamic 
enough to adapt to this constantly evolving technology.22  
I. WHY ARE BLOCKCHAIN LAWS  
SO DIFFICULT TO DRAFT? 
 It can require an intricate dance to draft and pass any type of legislation, 
and it is especially difficult to prevent bills from becoming unduly complicated. 
One legendary story from the 1950s recalls a businessman who was charged 
with violating a complex regulation related to price setting. When the defendant 
“betrayed some unfamiliarity with the regulation, the judge asked him whether 
he had ever read it. The defendant replied indignantly, ‘Read it, Judge? I can’t 
even lift it!’”23 
 While “lifting” laws written on paper is no longer an issue in the digital age, 
the truth is that our lawmaking process is no less difficult than it was seventy-
five years ago. In many ways, it is more demanding for legislators than it used 
                                                                                                                               
 21. H.R. 6154, 116th Cong. (2020). 
 22. EHRLICH, supra note 1, at 17 (“[T]echnology constantly changes, and regulations and pro-
cedures that are premised on a set of technological ‘facts’ may be severely challenged when those 
facts change.”). 
 23. Reed Dickerson, How to Write a Law, 31 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 14, 22–23 (1955). 
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to be.24 As technology develops quickly, modern lawmakers must learn at a fu-
rious pace just to comprehend the technology they are tasked with regulating. 
In this way, the high learning curve of blockchain technology presents a chal-
lenge for lawyers, legislators, and others who do not have technical expertise. 
 This Part will explain why regulation of blockchain-enabled applications is 
needed. It will also identify several reasons why drafting laws relating to this 
new technology can be a heavy lift for lawmakers. 
A. Why Create Laws Related to Blockchain Technology?  
1. Protecting the Public from Harm 
 Blockchain technology is a complicated field, and innovation in this space 
is developing rapidly. This innovation will occur regardless of a legislature’s 
reluctance or willingness to draft laws to regulate this industry. As state and 
federal legislators are struggling to define a regulatory scheme, members of the 
public who are excited about the possibilities of investing in something new like 
digital assets may suffer from harm. 
 This has, of course, already happened in various ways. In a recent high-
profile example, members of the public were invited to invest in initial coin 
offerings (ICOs), buying tokens as a way to invest in start-up companies.25 One 
study reported that approximately 78 percent of the ICOs offered in 2017 were 
actually scams.26 In the United States, 33 percent of ICO investors believe that 
ICO operators “deceived them or withheld information from them.”27 The ICO 
market significantly cooled as federal prosecutors and the SEC began aggres-
sively taking action against leaders of fraudulent ICOs, demonstrating how reg-
ulatory enforcement can indeed protect investors from harm.28 
                                                                                                                               
 24. Even if one disregards today’s polarized political climate, “[s]mall bureaucratic distinc-
tions add hurdles to any legislative action, slowing down or even stifling the passage of lower-
priority bills.” Danny Nelson, Blockchain Bills Are Advancing in the New York State Senate—Here’s 
Why, COINDESK (Feb 14, 2020 5:00 AM), https://www.coindesk.com/blockchain-bills-are-advanc 
ing-in-the-new-york-state-senate-heres-why [https://perma.cc/CE4R-B7XH]. 
 25. Jonathan Chester, Can Your Startup Run an Initial Coin Offering? Yes, and Here’s How., 
FORBES (Feb 28, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jonathanchester/2018/02/28/can-my-startup-
run-an-initial-coin-offering/?sh=51e4cd345a30 [https://perma.cc/QBN4-ZCUF]. 
 26. Sherwin Dowlat, Satis Grp., Cryptoasset Market Coverage Initiation: Network Creation, 
BLOOMBERG PRO. SERVS. 24 (July 11, 2018), https://research.bloomberg.com/pub/res/d28giW28tf6 
G7T_Wr77aU0gDgFQ [https://perma.cc/YRS4-T4EH].  
 27. ICO Investor Sentiment and Outlook Review 2020, XANGLE (Nov. 30, 2020), https://s3.ap-
northeast-2.amazonaws.com/upload.xangle.io/files/xangle_research/20201130_xangle_(EN).pdf [http 
s://perma.cc/7838-4JPN]. 
 28. Indeed, some ICO scammers are now serving time in prison. See, e.g., Mohammad 
Musharraf, Crypto Founder Sentenced to Seven Years in Prison for $25 Million Scam, 
COINTELEGRAPH (June 17, 2020), https://cointelegraph.com/news/crypto-founder-sentenced-to-seven-
years-in-prison-for-25-million-scam [https://web.archive.org/web/20201202024301if_/https://cointele 
graph.com/news/crypto-founder-sentenced-to-seven-years-in-prison-for-25-million-scam]; Christian 
Berthelsen, Crypto Firm Co-Founder Gets Year in Prison Over Debit Card Scam, BLOOMBERG 
(Dec. 15, 2020), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-12-15/crypto-firm-co-founder-gets-
year-in-prison-over-debit-card-scam [https://perma.cc/BNJ7-LCDB]; see also Park & Park, supra 
note 13, at 106–07. 
 




190 61 JURIMETRICS 
 However, cryptocurrency scams are persisting beyond the ICO craze. The 
FTC recently warned the public that scammers are continually finding new ways 
to “trick people.”29 Members of the public are clearly at risk of a multitude of 
foreseeable—and unforeseeable—problems as applications of this technology 
develop, including fraudulent investments, breaches of privacy on blockchain 
platforms, digital identity theft, and insufficient data protection. Given these 
threats to the public, it is not appropriate for regulators to dawdle as blockchain 
applications continue to rapidly advance. 
2. Attracting Innovation 
 While they work to protect the public, legislators and regulators can also 
use laws to signal their commitment to attracting blockchain-related companies 
to their locations. Some jurisdictions, including countries like Estonia and Swit-
zerland30 and U.S. states like Wyoming,31 have already implemented regulatory 
schemes designed to win the interjurisdictional competition for blockchain busi-
ness.32  
 The resulting tension between protecting the public while promoting inno-
vation lies at the heart of regulating digital assets and other applications of 
blockchain technology, as discussed in more detail in Section III.A. Despite the 
need for blockchain-related regulation, numerous challenges exist for lawmak-
ers seeking to draft laws in this area—starting with the fact that the word “block-
chain” does not have a commonly understood definition. 
B. The Legislative Definition Problem 
 What is the legal definition of blockchain? This simple question has proved 
to be exceedingly difficult to answer. States considering blockchain legislation 
have focused on different characteristics of this new technology, meaning that 
“[d]efinitions in legislation introduced in 2018 in California, Florida, Nebraska 
and Tennessee differ[ed] from those of industry groups and from each other.”33 
In some cases, the definitions were in conflict.34 These inconsistent definitions 
                                                                                                                               
 29. See Cristina Miranda, Avoiding a Cryptocurrency Scam, FED. TRADE COMM’N CONSUMER 
INFO. (July 16, 2020), https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/blog/2020/07/avoiding-cryptocurrency-scam 
[https://perma.cc/3K2M-ELJK]. 
 30. Although a full discussion of international law is beyond the scope of this Article, block-
chain’s global scale means that numerous countries around the world are adopting laws related to 
this technology. This is particularly true in the area of cryptocurrency. See generally Bart Custers 
& Lara Overwater, Regulating Initial Coin Offerings and Cryptocurrencies: A Comparison of 
Different Approaches in Nine Jurisdictions Worldwide, 10 EUR. J.L. & TECH. (2019), https://ejlt.org/ 
index.php/ejlt/article/view/718/977 [https://perma.cc/7Y9P-4VHH].  
 31. See infra Section IV.B. 
 32. For more about this competition, see infra Section II.D. 
 33. UNIF. L. COMM’N, GUIDANCE NOTE REGARDING THE RELATION BETWEEN THE UNIFORM 
ELECTRONIC TRANSACTIONS ACT AND THE FEDERAL ESIGN ACT, BLOCKCHAIN TECHNOLOGY AND 
“SMART CONTRACTS” 7 (Jan. 2019), https://www.uniformlaws.org/HigherLogic/System/Download 
DocumentFile.ashx?DocumentFileKey=d2026984-1040-3c6f-62c8-a676b12d7bff&forceDialog=0 
[https://perma.cc/B2SH-6JGX]. 
 34. Id. 
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are problematic, as they “actually introduce legal uncertainty where it did not 
previously exist, and invite unnecessary and expensive litigation.”35  
 A clear definition of blockchain is necessary for legislative purposes as 
well, as it is required to help a jurisdiction create clear policies.36 Moreover, a 
state’s definition should enable policymakers and the public to focus on “the 
most unique value that the technology can deliver. It should be accessible to and 
understandable by the public, and yet technically specific enough to ensure that 
the [jurisdiction] can reap maximum benefit.”37 With such a high bar, legislators 
have understandably struggled to construct a working definition for this new 
technology. 
 The California Blockchain Working Group, after much discussion and de-
bate, created a new definition of blockchain in 2020 for state legislative pur-
poses: 
“Blockchain” is a domain of technology used to build decentralized systems 
that increase the verifiability of data shared among a group of participants that 
may not necessarily have a pre-existing trust relationship. 
Any such system must include one or more “distributed ledgers,” specialized 
datastores that provide a mathematically verifiable ordering of transactions 
recorded in the datastore. It may also include “smart contracts” that allow par-
ticipants to automate pre-agreed business processes. These smart contracts are 
implemented by embedding software in transactions recorded in the datas-
tore.38 
 The New York Senate took a simpler approach, defining blockchain as “a 
mathematically secured, chronological, and decentralized consensus ledger or 
database, whether maintained via internet interaction, peer-to-peer network, or 
otherwise used to authenticate, record, share and synchronize transactions in 
their respective electronic ledgers or databases.”39 
 Both of these definitions are technically correct, and they both reflect the 
policy decisions of their respective states. For example, California deliberately 
used the more flexible term “datastore,” instead of “record” or “log,” to reflect 
the verifiability of data shared amongst participants, the many use cases of this 
type of ledger, and the fact that many datastores could exist at once.40 
                                                                                                                               
 35. Id. 
 36. See Angela Walch, The Path of the Blockchain Lexicon (and the Law), 36 REV. BANKING 
& FIN. L. 713, 729 (2017) (“How can regulators (or anyone else) even tell whether people are dis-
cussing the same topic or manifestation of technology when people explain the technology, its risks, 
and its potential benefits using divergent terminologies?”). 
 37. CAL. BLOCKCHAIN WORKING GRP., supra note 3, at 18. 
 38. Id. 
 39. S. 6037A, 2019–2020 Leg. (N.Y. 2019). The bill is now in the hands of the state Assembly. 
Senate Bill S6037A, N.Y. ST. SENATE (2019), https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/bills/2019/s60 
37 [https://perma.cc/TDJ9-4P4G]. 
 40. See David Tennenhouse & Brian Behlendorf, CA Blockchain Working Grp., Blockchain 
Definition and Foundational Building Blocks (Dec. 5, 2019), https://www.govops.ca.gov/wp-cont 
ent/uploads/sites/11/2019/12/Blockchain-Definition-and-Foundational-Building-Blocks-Brian-Behle 
ndorf-and-David-Tennenhouse.pdf [https://perma.cc/JA3Y-EFAS].  
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 One could argue that the lack of a uniform statutory definition is partly re-
sponsible for the patchwork nature of state blockchain regulation. After all, 
without a similar definition, it is nearly impossible to set policy goals and pass 
parallel legislation in multiple jurisdictions. However, the problem of incon-
sistent definitions is just the tip of the iceberg of interjurisdictional competi-
tion.41 This competition is unlikely to subside even if the federal government or 
the Uniform Law Commission enacted a well-accepted, standardized definition 
of blockchain technology.  
C. The Fast Pace of Blockchain Technology Development 
 Law always moves slower than technology.42 This is partly because law-
makers and agencies can “struggle to capture emerging technologies in dusty 
regulatory frameworks.”43 For example, securities laws drafted in the 1930s 
could not have anticipated the sale of digital assets.44 Even more recently drafted 
laws and regulations relating to the Internet do not fit blockchain technology.45 
Lawmakers must decide whether to fit this revolutionary technology within ex-
isting legal frameworks or start all over with new legislative schemes.  
 The constantly evolving nature of blockchain technology presents another 
challenge. This “industry is in its early stages of maturation,” making it difficult 
to determine the initial policy choices that would lead to effective regulation.46 
There are also technical concerns still lurking within blockchain technology, 
such as locating the “weak points” that might be “gamed by bad actors,” which 
could give rise to unanticipated legal problems.47  
 Finally, even at this early stage, lawmakers must consider which aspects of 
the technology are important enough to regulate. Some of these are obvious, 
such as cryptocurrency and other forms of digital assets that involve sales to 
members of the public. But even within this category, it is “still too early to tell 
exactly which of the drivers of digital asset excitement is dominant,” putting 
                                                                                                                               
 41. See infra Section II.D (describing the interjurisdictional competition for blockchain tech-
nology). 
 42. Kollen Post, Law Decoded: Regulators Are Guarded But Getting There, July 3–10, 
COINTELEGRAPH (July 10, 2020), https://cointelegraph.com/news/law-decoded-regulators-are-guar 
ded-but-getting-there-july-3-10 [https://perma.cc/VYN7-UW85] (“Policy changes slowly. Crypto 
wants to move fast.”). 
 43. Recent Guidance, Securities Regulation—Financial Technology—SEC Provides 
Analytical Tools for Assessing Digital Assets.—SEC, Framework for “Investment Contract” 
Analysis of Digital Assets (2019), 132 HARV. L. REV. 2418, 2420 (2019) [hereinafter Recent 
Guidance]. 
 44. See John W. Bagby et al., An Emerging Political Economy of the Blockchain: Enhancing 
Regulatory Opportunities, 88 UMKC L. REV. 419, 456–67 (2019) (summarizing recent SEC 
cryptocurrency enforcement actions). 
 45. See Primavera De Filippi & Samer Hassan, Blockchain Technology as a Regulatory 
Technology: From Code Is Law to Law Is Code , 21 FIRST MONDAY (Dec. 2016), https://firstmon 
day.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/7113/5657 [https://perma.cc/AFJ5-J89E] (Blockchain tech-
nology “promotes a new way of thinking about the law.”). 
 46. Syren Johnstone, Taxonomies of Digital Assets: Recursive or Progressive?, 2 STAN. J. 
BLOCKCHAIN L. & POL’Y 78, 79 (2019). 
 47. Id. 
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“regulatory bodies in a tough position.”48 In this way, the wide variety of block-
chain projects and the speed at which they are developing creates an additional 
barrier to effective regulation. 
 As an example, imagine a developer creates a brand-new digital asset and 
offers it to the public. How should regulators approach the regulation of this 
asset? Should regulators first consider the substance of the project, its connec-
tion to a decentralized ledger, its effect on consumers’ privacy and security, or 
its potential to evade anti-money laundering and “[k]now [y]our [c]ustomer” 
laws49 (or all of the above)? An effective regulatory scheme would need to in-
clude rules that are flexible enough to manage future technical developments as 
well as today’s technologies. Otherwise, laws may need to be reconsidered and 
amended whenever a new technical application emerges. 
D. Blockchain Technology’s High Learning Curve for Lawmakers 
 Blockchain technology can be complicated and intimidating, and few law-
makers have training in computer science. A 2016 survey found only that only 
four of the 535 members of Congress had formal computer science degrees.50 
While the technical aspects of blockchain can be difficult to explain, most leg-
islators can learn enough to understand the fundamentals.51 
 New York’s State Senate offers a case in point. The Senate’s technical ad-
visor reported that in 2019, “staffers and senators asked basic questions about 
blockchain and distributed ledger technology, prompting [the technical advisor] 
to develop an explainer presentation.”52 One year later, in 2020, many of the 
senators “appear more comfortable with the technology, which helps them see 
the value of [potential] legislation.”53  
 Legislators need not dive into minor technical details of blockchain to be 
able to regulate it. It is more important for legislators to focus on the function of 
blockchain and its practical applications, asking not “what is blockchain?” but 
                                                                                                                               
 48. M. Todd Henderson & Max Raskin, A Regulatory Classification of Digital Assets: Toward 
an Operational Howey Test for Cryptocurrencies, ICOs, and Other Digital Assets, 2019 COLUM. 
BUS. L. REV. 443, 448 (2019). 
 49. See Craig Adeyanju, What Crypto Exchanges Do to Comply With KYC, AML and CFT 
Regulations, COINTELEGRAPH (May 17, 2019), https://cointelegraph.com/news/what-crypto-excha 
nges-do-to-comply-with-kyc-aml-and-cft-regulations [https://perma.cc/WHD6-QN4Q] (Regulators 
want to ensure that crypto exchanges “discourage illicit transactions and improve account/wallet 
security.”). 
 50. Andy Meek, We Asked Every Member of Congress with a Computer Science Degree About 
Apple’s War with the FBI, BGR (Mar. 23, 2016, 10:19 AM), https://bgr.com/2016/03/23/apple-vs-
fbi-congress-interviews/ [https://perma.cc/S4X7-R4JD]. 
 51. Regulators must, at a minimum, fully comprehend “the risks posed by the technology” or 
they will be “more likely to make bad decisions about whether and how to regulate.” Walch, supra 
note 36, at 729. 
 52. Nelson, supra note 24. 
 53. Id. 
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“what can blockchain do?”54 Policymakers should focus on the use cases of 
blockchain, rather than its underlying technology.55  
 Professor Angela Walch offered prescriptive recommendations for regula-
tors learning about blockchain, advising them to cultivate their expertise (in-
cluding self-education), consult with other regulators, follow the activity of 
standards organizations and academia, and “[w]atch and [l]earn” as the technol-
ogy stabilizes.56 Professor Walch also counsels lawmakers to “[a]dopt a [c]riti-
cal [m]indset” in this educational process, to ensure they are not unduly 
influenced by hype or unreliable sources.57 
 Legislators could also learn more about blockchain through the use of leg-
islative working groups or task forces. For example, California’s Blockchain 
Working Group drafted a report in accessible language, enabling state legisla-
tors to learn more about the technology and its potential applications for Cali-
fornia in one comprehensive document.58 The federal government has tried to 
follow this path. In 2019, a bipartisan group of senators proposed a bill directing 
the Secretary of Commerce to establish a federal Blockchain Working Group in 
2019.59 However, the bill, entitled the “Blockchain Promotion Act,” is still cur-
rently in committee.60  
 As a law professor who taught the first Blockchain and the Law class in 
San Francisco, I can anecdotally report that blockchain and cryptocurrencies are 
not easy concepts for nontechnical learners to grasp. However, over the course 
of one semester, my law students (most of whom did not have any technical 
training beforehand) were able to draft final reports and presentations not just 
describing the technology, but also analyzing the use cases deploying the tech-
nology. With a bit of time and effort, state and federal lawmakers can understand 
the potential for blockchain to transform their jurisdictions.  
II. FIVE FACTORS FOR LEGISLATIVE CONSIDERATION 
 In light of the difficult nature of regulating blockchain, this Part offers five 
factors lawmakers should consider as they work to draft blockchain and crypto 
regulation.  
                                                                                                                               
 54. J.P. Schmidt & Tung Chan, The Future Infrastructure of Business: A Primer on Blockchain 
and the Evolving Regulations, 13 HAW. B.J., Apr. 2020, at *13, *13, Westlaw. Of course, legislators 
must understand enough to be able to distinguish blockchain from other technologies. 
 55. Jason Albert, What’s Next for Blockchain: Technology, Economics and Regulation, 
MICROSOFT: EU POLICY BLOG (June 20 2016), https://blogs.microsoft.com/eupolicy/2016/06/20/ 
whats-next-for-blockchain-technology-economics-and-regulation/ [https://perma.cc/QNZ4-ASB3]. 
 56. Walch, supra note 36, at 746–52. 
 57. Id. at 753–59. This could include lobbyists. See infra Section III.B (discussing industry 
influence on the Cryptocurrency Act of 2020). 
 58. See CAL. BLOCKCHAIN WORKING GRP., supra note 3, at 2, 18. 
 59. See generally H.R. 1361, 116th Congress (2019).  
 60. Id.  
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A. Policy Decision: Innovation vs. Protecting the Public Interest 
 In an ideal world, governments would be able to promote both innovation 
and the public interest. In reality, however, legislators usually need to debate 
and choose whether they will prioritize innovative technological development 
or consumer/public protection. This is especially true in the context of block-
chain, since the public perception of blockchain varies widely. Many members 
of the public first heard of blockchain through Bitcoin, the digital currency. But 
early illegal use cases of blockchain technology also made headlines, including 
the infamous Silk Road darknet marketplace61 and repeated cases of fraudulent 
theft through Initial Coin Offerings.62 While the technology is neutral, block-
chain can be used in malicious ways that harm the public.63 Even well-meaning 
technology can implicate privacy and data protection concerns.64  
 It is therefore “essential for both the industry and society that consumers 
and the capital market are protected from abuse.”65 No state or federal jurisdic-
tion should enable blockchain technology to develop without guardrails to pro-
tect the public. The question is where those guardrails should lie. If states wait 
too long to regulate, the public may be harmed, and the costs of imposing re-
quirements on industries that have already been established will be too great. 
However, if states develop restrictive regulations too early or the laws “become 
onerous,”66 businesses will relocate to more friendly jurisdictions. States in this 
position risk killing off innovation or pushing it to other states.67  
 Part of the reason blockchain technology’s applications are so challenging 
to regulate is that it “is difficult, if not impossible, for regulators to construct a 
framework that achieves clear rules, market integrity, and financial innova-
tion.”68 This complex question explains the spirit of experimentation among 
states discussed in Part V, with some choosing restrictive regulatory structures, 
some choosing permissive approaches, and others choosing the middle. Regard-
                                                                                                                               
 61. See generally IG Analyst, The Silk Road to Bitcoin: Has the Crypto Escaped its Dark 
Past?, IG (Feb. 5, 2018, 9:58 PM), https://www.ig.com/au/trading-opportunities/the-silk-road-to-
bitcoin--has-the-crypto-escaped-its-dark-past--41990-180205 [https://perma.cc/8C48-THVR]. 
 62. One study reported that nearly 80 percent of initial coin offerings in 2017 were scams. Ana 
Alexandre, New Study Says 80 Percent of ICOs Conducted in 2017 Were Scams, COINTELEGRAPH 
(July 13, 2018), https://cointelegraph.com/news/new-study-says-80-percent-of-icos-conducted-in-
2017-were-scams [https://perma.cc/MB79-4T77]. 
 63. Neitz, supra note 6.  
 64. CAL. BLOCKCHAIN WORKING GRP., supra note 3, at v. 
 65. Johnstone, supra note 46. 
 66. Michael J. O’Connor, Overreaching Its Mandate? Considering the SEC’s Authority to 
Regulate Cryptocurrency Exchanges, 11 DREXEL L. REV. 539, 595 (2019). 
 67. Blockchain businesses will move for regulatory reasons. See Daniel Kuhn, The 
Cryptocurrency Act of 2020 Is ‘Dead on Arrival,’ Washington Tells Sponsors, COINDESK (Mar. 11, 
2020, 1:19 P.M.), https://www.coindesk.com/the-cryptocurrency-act-of-2020-is-dead-on-arrival-
washington-dc-tells-sponsors [https://perma.cc/AP8X-KULR] (“Many projects are simply choosing 
to move elsewhere” because of regulatory uncertainty.). 
 68. Park & Park, supra note 13, at 101 n.16 (citing Chris Brummer & Yesha Yadav, Fintech 
and the Innovation Trilemma, 107 GEO. L.J. 235 (2019)). 
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less of a jurisdiction’s ultimate direction, legislators drafting blockchain legis-
lation must evaluate how to protect the public while encouraging creative 
technological development.  
B. Ethical Considerations 
 California was the first (and so far, the only) state to consider ethical con-
siderations in the early stages of regulation. This author published the first law 
review article analyzing ethics in the blockchain industry in December 2019,69 
and also served as the primary drafter of the Ethical Considerations section in 
California’s Blockchain Working Group report.70 
 Depending on the type of blockchain at issue, numerous ethical issues may 
come up for regulators. For example, the increasing centralization of permis-
sionless blockchains and the rise of permissioned blockchains may raise con-
cerns about personal ethics, such as bias and conflicts of interest. As trends 
suggest that governance of blockchain systems is moving toward centraliza-
tion,71 individuals may have power to influence decisions made on that block-
chain. If so, there is a potential for that individual’s bias and conflicts of interest 
to come into play.72  
 Although ethical discussions around blockchain appear slower to develop 
than the technology itself, several paradigms have been put forth advocating 
ethical considerations in this industry.73 For example, the World Economic Fo-
rum recently asked participants and policymakers to sign on to its “Presidio 
Principles,” an agreement to consider transparency and accessibility, agency and 
interoperability, privacy and security, and accountability and governance.74 
MIT’s Digital Currency Initiative included the topic of blockchain ethics at its 
2019 “Cryptoeconomics Systems Summit.”75  
                                                                                                                               
 69. Neitz, supra note 6, at 41. 
 70. CAL. BLOCKCHAIN WORKING GRP., supra note 3, at i. 
 71. For a detailed discussion of this phenomenon, see Neitz, supra note 6, at 48–49.  
 72. For example, the recent decisions of the Ethereum Foundation to implement a hard fork in 
response to the 2016 DAO hack, but not in response to the 2017 Parity smart contract bug, demon-
strate the potential for a conflict of interest to affect the governance of blockchains. Id. at 49–51. 
Similar concerns exist with the development of Facebook’s Libra (now rebranded as “Diem”). Id. 
at 53–57. 
 73. There are more ethical debates happening in the realm of artificial intelligence. See, e.g., 
Tim O’Brien et al., How Global Tech Companies Can Champion Ethical AI, WORLD ECON. F., 
https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2020/01/tech-companies-ethics-responsible-ai-microsoft/ [https:// 
perma.cc/QTS3-RXP8]; Brandie Nonnecke, The New HR: Employing Equitable AI, UC BERKELEY 
(July 2020) (recorded online lecture applying the FATTS principles to AI); Jessica Fjeld & Adam 
Nagy, Principled Artificial Intelligence, BERKMAN KLEIN CTR. FOR INTERNET & SOCIETY HARV. 
UNIV. (Jan. 15, 2020), https://cyber.harvard.edu/publication/2020/principled-ai#:~:text=This%20e 
ffort%20uncovered%20a%20growing,and%20promotion%20of%20human%20values [https://perma. 
cc/T4BK-AQE3]. 
 74. Presidio Principles: Foundational Values for a Decentralized Future, WORLD ECON. F., 
(2020), https://www.weforum.org/communities/presidio-principles [https://perma.cc/B78N-MG62]. 
 75. Mike Orcutt, Why It’s Time to Start Talking About Blockchain Ethics, MIT TECH. REV. 
(Oct. 10, 2019), https://www.technologyreview.com/2019/10/10/132652/why-its-time-to-start-talk 
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 In addition, the Beeck Center for Social Impact + Innovation at Georgetown 
University published the “Blockchain Ethical Design Framework,” with a focus 
on six “root issues”: “governance, identity, access, verification and authentica-
tion, ownership of data, and security.”76 This structure more specifically applies 
to developers, and is not a code of conduct or a legislative model, but it reiterates 
the idea that “we all share the responsibility to . . . demand intentional ethical 
approaches in the design and application of data and technology for social 
good.”77  
 California’s Blockchain Working Group considered ethical issues related 
to social impact, including fairness, equity, accessibility, trust and transparency, 
and sustainability.78 The Group proposed an ethical framework for the adoption 
of blockchain technology that is directed toward lawmakers as well as industry 
players.79 This framework encompasses three main principles: 
i. Address key ethical design goals 
a) Seek societal benefit: Maximize good and minimize bad. 
b) Equity: Does this benefit all Californians, or only a few? 
c) Efficiency and effectiveness: How can we achieve ethical design and 
use cases without slowing innovation? 
ii. Consider ethical uses of blockchain technology 
a) Fairness: Is this technology designed and deployed in a fair, nondis-
criminatory manner? 
b) Accessibility: Design to include the most vulnerable user. 
c) Responsibility: Anticipate and design for all possible uses. 
d) Sustainability: Create technology to advance sustainability, public 
health, and corporate social responsibility. 
iii. Minimize unintended consequences 
 a) Are there unintended biases or conflicts in the design or use of this 
 technology?80 
                                                                                                                               
ing-about-blockchain-ethics/ [https://perma.cc/D3ML-5AST]. The head of the MIT Digital Cur-
rency Initiative, Rhys Lindmark, noted that “[i]f blockchain technology can be reasonably expected 
to make a significant difference in society, then it deserves its own field of ethics, just like biotech-
nology, artificial intelligence, and nuclear technology.” Id. 
 76. Cara Lapointe & Lara Fishbane, The Blockchain Ethical Design Framework, BEECK CTR. 
FOR SOC. IMPACT + INNOVATION, http://beeckcenter.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/ 
The-Blockchain-Ethical-Design-Framework.pdf [https://perma.cc/3FFE-8KLZ].  
 77. Id.; see also Yong Tang et al., Ethics of Blockchain: A Framework of Technology, 
Applications, Impacts, and Research Directions, 33 INFO. TECH. & PEOPLE 602, 602 (2020) (offering 
a “systematic study on the ethics of blockchain, mapping its main socio-technical challenges in 
technology and applications”). 
 78. CAL. BLOCKCHAIN WORKING GRP., supra note 3, at 28–30. 
 79. Id. at 23–57. 
 80. Lawmakers should always be considering the possibility of implicit bias in their legislative 
discussions and drafting. See Justin D. Levinson & Robert J. Smith, Systemic Implicit Bias, 126 
YALE L.J. FORUM 406, 414 (2017) (“Systemic implicit bias can influence how policymakers choose 
between punitive and preventative frameworks for addressing social problems.”); see also Michele 
Benedetto Neitz, Socioeconomic Bias in the Judiciary, 61 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 137, 137 (2013) (dis-
cussing implicit bias on the part of judges). 
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b) Are any populations being unintentionally harmed by the way this tech-
nology is developing? 
c) Does this technology promote violations of local, national, or interna-
tional law?81 
 
 This useful framework offers guidance to regulators seeking to make sure 
they do not inadvertently violate ethical considerations, especially with hastily 
drafted legislation. Two examples illustrate the usefulness of this approach. 
First, it could be relatively easy to create a certification process for blockchain 
developers who provide services to the State of California. But will that certifi-
cation process limit approval to developers with degrees from elite institutions? 
This type of action would raise equity concerns, as the blockchain industry 
should be working more toward diversity in gender, cultural backgrounds, and 
perspectives of industry participants. Second, could companies who advance 
environmentally sustainable blockchain development receive tax credits from 
the state? Although different jurisdictions may embrace different ethical princi-
ples, legislators should discuss these issues as they contemplate ways to regulate 
this new technology. 
C. Transparency 
 Since “the rule of law requires transparency,”82 jurisdictions in the United 
States are governed by transparency laws. The federal government’s adminis-
trative agencies must abide by the Administrative Procedure Act, which (among 
other things) orders federal agencies to act “transparently and fairly.”83 Califor-
nia’s Bagley-Keene Act requires state boards or commissions (including work-
ing groups) to “publicly notice their meetings, prepare agendas, accept public 
testimony and conduct their meetings in public unless specifically authorized to 
meet in closed session.”84 
 Legislators are likely already aware of the government transparency laws 
in their jurisdiction, but there are other reasons transparency is especially im-
portant in the context of blockchain regulation. First, all stakeholders should be 
given the opportunity to weigh in on laws governing this nascent industry.85 The 
industry players on the front line have valuable perspectives to share with leg-
islators, and input from various stakeholders will create more efficient regula-
tion. Moreover, the technology is moving quickly, and there may be applications 
of blockchain in development that legislators do not even know about yet. As 
the Cryptocurrency Act of 2020 revealed,86 drafting laws without the collabora-
tion of diverse stakeholders is ineffective. 
                                                                                                                               
 81. CAL. BLOCKCHAIN WORKING GRP., supra note 3, at 32.  
 82. Exec. Order No. 13892, 84 Fed. Reg. 55,239 (Oct. 15, 2019). 
 83. 5 U.S.C. 551 et seq. (2020). 
 84. Open Meetings, ST. CAL. DEP’T JUST., https://oag.ca.gov/open-meetings [https://perma.cc/ 
NEF7-D9C9]. 
 85. Walch, supra note 36, at 757–59 (encouraging legislators to consider diverse perspec-
tives); see also discussion supra Section II.B. 
 86. See infra Section III.B (discussing the Cryptocurrency Act of 2020). 
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 Second, although blockchain technology may eventually touch all areas of 
business, members of the public may be unaware of blockchain technology’s 
potential. Legislative debates could double as community education opportuni-
ties, allowing people who would not ordinarily be interested in blockchain to 
attend Working Group meetings, task force briefings, and other public discus-
sions of this new technology. Such meetings could be advertised to nontechnical 
professions and community organizations, and should be held in easily accessi-
ble public places and online. Legislators themselves could reach out to their 
nontechnical constituents and offer ways to connect them to educators and lead-
ers in the blockchain industry. Such transparency could create a culture of inno-
vation in a particular jurisdiction, while increasing public credibility for 
whatever regulations eventually develop.  
D. Interjurisdictional Competition 
 States have been competing with each other since the beginning of the re-
public, and the competition has not decreased as our economy has become more 
complex.87 In corporate law, interjurisdictional competitions are a common af-
fair. The state that “wins” the race, creating the environment to attract the most 
businesses to that state, can secure both tax revenue and additional jobs for state 
residents. Delaware indisputably won the fight for corporate charters among 
states, with over 1.5 million legal entities, including 67 percent of all Fortune 
500 corporations, incorporated there.88 The reasons for Delaware’s success in-
clude specialized legislation that is updated each year to adapt to technical and 
other changes, as well as a corporate-specific chancery court that can move 
cases quickly along.89 
 When Limited Liability Companies (LLCs) were created in Wyoming in 
1977, another interjurisdictional race was on.90 Despite concerns that interstate 
LLCs would have problems without uniform LLC statutes among the states, 
“most states enacted LLC statutes before efforts to develop standardize statutes 
came to fruition.”91 As a result, only twelve states ultimately adopted uniform 
acts, and there is less uniformity for LLC statutes than for other business 
forms.92 
 The same is happening now with statutes related to blockchain technology. 
States who can win the race to attract blockchain businesses to incorporate and 
domicile in their state can earn more than just increased tax revenues from start-
up companies. Such a state could also create a reputation for being friendly to 
                                                                                                                               
 87. For a brief history of interjurisdictional competition in the context of corporate law, see 
JONATHAN R. MACEY ET AL., THE LAW OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS: CASES, MATERIALS, AND 
PROBLEMS 125 (13th ed. 2017). 
 88. 2019 Annual Report Statistics, DELAWARE DIV. CORPS., https://corpfiles.delaware.gov/ 
Annual-Reports/Division-of-Corporations-2019-Annual-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/M7C2-SYKH]. 
 89. MACEY ET AL., supra note 87, 132–33. 
 90. Id. at 911–12. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id.  
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technological innovation, a reputation that would have impacts beyond block-
chain technology. For this reason, some states (including Wyoming, the first 
state to draft LLC statutes in 1977) jumped out first to enact permissive block-
chain- and crypto-friendly regulations.93 
 Before enacting regulations, however, state legislatures should ensure they 
are clear on the policies underlying those regulations. For example, as discussed 
in Section II.A above, states should consciously strike a balance between pro-
tecting the public and encouraging innovation. Without establishing prioritized 
policies in advance, a state may win the interjurisdictional competition in the 
short term but create unintended consequences, such as unnecessary litigation 
or public harm, in the long term.  
E. Uniformity 
 As a member of the California Blockchain Working Group, this author 
asked industry leaders in late 2019 what they preferred to see in blockchain reg-
ulation. Each of them clearly and unequivocally stated that uniformity of regu-
lation across the United States would be good for business. It would be much 
easier for blockchain businesses to plan and expand their operations if states 
were aligned on regulatory issues, particularly in the area of digital assets.  
 The Uniform Law Commission (ULC) has made several attempts to create 
a standardized approach to digital asset regulation.94 In 2017, the ULC proposed 
the Uniform Regulation of Virtual-Currency Businesses Act to provide “a stat-
utory framework for the regulation of companies engaging in ‘virtual-currency 
business activity.’”95 An accompanying “Supplemental Act” in 2018 provided 
rules related to commercial law and the Uniform Commercial Code.96  
 These model acts had a short and controversial lifespan. No state enacted 
the model legislation, and only a handful of states introduced it.97 Wyoming 
actively resisted the ULC’s request to withdraw Wyoming’s pending blockchain 
                                                                                                                               
 93. See infra Section IV.B (discussing Wyoming). 
 94. See Steven O. Weise & Jonathan Mollod, A Proposed Statutory Framework for State 
Regulation of Virtual Currency Businesses: The Uniform Law Commission’s “Uniform Regulation 




 95. Id. 
 96. Virtual-Currency Businesses Act, Supplemental Commercial Law for the Uniform 
Regulation of, UNIF. L. COMM’N (2018), https://www.uniformlaws.org/committees/community-ho 
me?CommunityKey=fc398fb5-2885-4efb-a3bb-508650106f95 [https://perma.cc/M7LA-F9SD]. 
 97. Andrea Tinianow, A Split Emerges in Blockchain Law: Wyoming's Approach Versus the 
Supplemental Act, FORBES (Mar. 7, 2019, 12:41 P.M.), https://www.forbes.com/sites/andreatinia 
now/2019/03/07/a-split-emerges-in-blockchain-law-wyomings-approach-versus-the-supplemental-
act/#33de2308719a [https://perma.cc/7YML-GREQ]; see also Ed Drake, Uniform Law Commission 
Wants US States to Hold Off on Crypto Regulations, COINGEEK (Mar. 28, 2019), https://coingeek. 
com/uniform-law-commission-wants-us-states-to-hold-off-on-crypto-regulations/ [https://perma.cc/ 
3FYF-VSJX] (As of March 2019, “no state ha[d] chosen to write ULC crypto laws onto their statute 
books.”).  
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legislation in favor of adopting the ULC’s approach.98 Wyoming’s legislators 
noted that the ULC’s model acts had not yet been enacted by any jurisdictions, 
and explained why they considered Wyoming’s regulatory approach to be the 
superior one.99 One month later, the ULC recognized the need to convene a 
committee to study how the Uniform Commercial Code could be amended in 
order to “deal with emerging technologies.”100 The ULC urged “states to refrain 
from enacting legislation pending the result of the committee’s work,”101 an act 
suggesting that the ULC recognized flaws in its proposed acts.102 Given the on-
going interjurisdictional race described in Section II.D, it seems absurd to ask 
states to wait on enacting blockchain legislation.  
 As of December 2020, only one state (Louisiana) had passed a virtual cur-
rency licensing statute based on the ULC’s uniform act.103 It is clear that, much 
like the race for corporate and LLC charters, the uniformity train has left this 
station. In the absence of federal legislation or effective model acts, states have 
already invested time and energy into drafting new laws. States like Wyoming, 
which has “actively decided to lead the charge in ensuring solvent, blockchain 
based” companies,104 will not willingly give up their leading positions in this 
area.  
III. THE CURRENT UNEASY MIX  
OF FEDERAL AND STATE BLOCKCHAIN REGULATION 
 Federal and state regulators are struggling to keep up with the fast pace of 
blockchain technology development. This Part will demonstrate how this strug-
gle is creating a wide variety of regulatory approaches. 
                                                                                                                               
 98. Tinianow, supra note 97. In response to the ULC’s request, one “prominent” member of 
the Wyoming Senate asked, “Who do these people think they are telling Wyoming to withdraw a 
bill?” Letter from Rep. Tyler Lindholm & Sen. Ogden Driskill, to Anita Ramasastry, President, 
Unif. L. Comm’n (Feb. 27, 2019), https://www.wyoleg.gov/InterimCommittee/2018/S3-Letter%20 
to%20Uniform%20Law%20Commission.pdf [https://perma.cc/NBR5-E77G]. 
 99. Letter from Rep. Tyler Lindholm & Sen. Ogden Driskill to Anita Ramasastry, supra note 98. 
 100. Caitlin Long, Seismic News About State Virtual Currency Laws: ULC Urges States to 
Withdraw Model Act, FORBES (Mar. 25, 2019, 10:07 P.M.), https://www.forbes.com/sites/caitlinlong/ 
2019/03/25/seismic-news-about-state-virtual-currency-laws-ulc-urges-states-to-withdraw-model-act/# 
453eda645fda [https://perma.cc/W6HU-PXZP]. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Drake, supra note 97. 
 103. See LA. STAT. ANN. §§ 6:1381–6:1394 (2020); see also Gary DeWaal & Cathy J. Yoon, 
Louisiana Serves Up New Virtual Currency Business Law Cajun Style, KATTEN FIN. MKTS. & 
FUNDS ADVISORY 1 (July 30, 2020), https://katten.com/files/863548_2020_07_30_frm_fmf_ louis 
iana_serves_up_new_virtual_currency_business_law_cajun_style.pdf [https://perma.cc/PF2E-3ECX]. 
 104. Letter from Rep. Tyler Lindholm & Sen. Ogden Driskill to Anita Ramasastry, supra note 
98; see also infra Section IV.B (discussing Wyoming’s efforts to attract blockchain business). 
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A. Patchwork Agency Regulation 
 The federal government’s attempt to regulate blockchain technology, par-
ticularly cryptocurrencies, is (to put it bluntly) a mess. Federal authorities inter-
pret laws relating to blockchain and cryptocurrencies differently.105 This 
confusing, piecemeal approach is epitomized by the struggle to determine how 
to even classify digital currency for regulatory purposes. The Internal Revenue 
Service (IRS) views cryptocurrency as property, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) classifies such currencies as securities, and the Commodity 
Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) considers cryptocurrency to be a com-
modity.106 There is clearly a need for a unified methodology, even just within 
blockchain’s narrow use case of cryptocurrencies, but this confusion is not a 
surprising result when “neither Congress nor the SEC has formally elucidated 
which digital assets are securities and which are not.”107 
 Different agencies are sending different messages, creating “regulatory 
whiplash.”108 Some, like the CFTC, are inclined toward experimentation to sup-
port blockchain and cryptocurrency development, while others are more cau-
tious.109 All of the agencies seeking to regulate blockchain technology and its 
applications would benefit from consideration of the five factors listed in Part 
III. Below is a short explanation of three distinctive agency approaches.  
                                                                                                                               
 105. Elena Perez, How the US and Europe Are Regulating Crypto in 2020, COINTELEGRAPH 
(July 12, 2020), https://cointelegraph.com/news/how-the-us-and-europe-are-regulating-crypto-in-
2020 [https://perma.cc/W384-EABE].  
 106. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, CFTC BACKGROUNDER ON OVERSIGHT OF 
AND APPROACH TO VIRTUAL CURRENCY FUTURES MARKETS 1 (2018), https://www. cftc.gov/sites/ 
default/files/idc/groups/public/%40customerprotection/documents/file/backgrounder_virtualcurren
cy01.pdf [https://perma.cc/EH75-5CBL]; see also Stephen O’Neal, SEC, CFTC, IRS and Others: A 
Guide To US Regulating Bodies, COINTELEGRAPH (May 26, 2018), https://cointelegraph.com/news/ 
sec-cftc-irs-and-others-a-guide-to-us-regulating-bodies [https://perma.cc/6Y26-9XHD] (“There are 
currently a number of federal regulators involved in crypto, and all of those bodies view cryptocur-
rencies like Bitcoin differently—defining it as a security, money, property or a commodity.”).  
 107. Henderson & Raskin, supra note 48, at 443. This confusion has a ripple effect, as “bank-
ing regulators—including the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), Federal Deposit 
Insurance Commission (FDIC), Federal Reserve, and Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection 
(CFPB)—have all grappled with how to oversee and regulate new technologically savvy entrants 
into the lending and payments industries.” Brummer & Yadav, supra note 68, at 240. 
 108. Schmidt & Chan, supra note 54, at *18. As this Article went to press, a bipartisan group 
of lawmakers introduced a bill intended to rectify some of these problems. The “Eliminate Barriers 
to Innovation Act of 2021” would direct the CFTC and the SEC “to jointly establish a digital asset 
working group” to clarify cryptocurrency regulations. H.R. 1602, 117th Congress (2021). At a min-
imum, the introduction of this legislation demonstrates that lawmakers are increasingly aware of the 
regulatory challenges discussed in this Article. 
 109. See Pomp Podcast #408: CFTC Chairman Heath Tarbert on Crypto Regulation (Oct. 15, 
2020), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FaAEeOys4J4 [https://perma.cc/J9FP-M834] (The CFTC 
is one of the most “forward-thinking” federal agencies in the context of crypto regulation, and the 
CFTC Chairman wants “to see the United States support innovation in [the blockchain] space.”).  
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1. SEC Safe Harbor Provision—A Work in Progress 
 The SEC missed its chance to establish a clear regulatory framework early 
in the life span of blockchain technology, instead adopting an approach charac-
terized by delay and a series of reversals on important decisions.110 The SEC’s 
delay “simultaneously encouraged unscrupulous actors to take advantage of am-
biguous regulations” and issue fraudulent tokens to Americans, while “driving 
away conscientious developers and entrepreneurs” to places with more devel-
oped laws.111 The SEC’s attempt to clarify its position in a limited area with the 
April 2019 issuance of a “Framework for ‘Investment Analysis’ of Digital As-
sets” has been called “too little too late.”112 
 In the meantime, SEC Commissioner Hester Peirce has earned the nick-
name “Crypto Mom.”113 In early 2020, she offered her take on the legislative 
problems related to blockchain technology, saying “[i]t is important to write 
rules that well-intentioned people can follow. When we see people struggling to 
find a way both to comply with the law and accomplish their laudable objec-
tives, we need to ask ourselves whether the law should change to enable them 
to pursue their efforts in confidence that they are doing so legally.”114 Peirce 
clearly views law and regulation as a way to promote, not thwart, the develop-
ment of blockchain and its use cases.  
 In February 2020, Peirce proposed a safe harbor provision for firms in the 
cryptocurrency space selling tokens to the public.115 Peirce described her pro-
posal as recognizing “the need to achieve the investor protection objectives of 
the securities laws, as well as the need to provide the regulatory flexibility that 
allows innovation to flourish.”116 The safe harbor proposal includes disclosure 
requirements for issuers and good faith obligations to ensure that token issuers 
are not fly-by-night companies. It also sets forth rules related to the purpose of 
token issuances and efforts to create liquidity for token users.117 
                                                                                                                               
 110. Schmidt & Chan, supra note 54, at *18; see also Recent Guidance, supra note 43, at 2423 
(“The SEC’s guidance in the past suffered from internal ambiguity.”). 
 111. Schmidt & Chan, supra note 54, at *17 (The SEC’s “confusion and misguidance has 
driven blockchain development away from the United States at a critical juncture.”). 
 112. Id.; see also Framework for “Investment Analysis” of Digital Assets, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. 
COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/corpfin/framework-investment-contract-analysis-digital-assets [https: 
//perma.cc/W7PB-BP6Z]. 
 113. Danny Nelson, SEC Commissioner Peirce Blasts Regulator’s Action Against Telegram, 
COINDESK (July 21, 2020), https://www.coindesk.com/sec-commissioner-pierce-blasts-regulators-
action-against-telegram [https://perma.cc/U23K-EPHR]. 
 114. Hester M. Peirce, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Running on Empty: A Proposal 
to Fill the Gap Between Regulation and Decentralization (Feb. 6, 2020), https://www.sec.gov/news/ 
speech/peirce-remarks-blockress-2020-02-06 [https://perma.cc/7AVD-S8H4]. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. The five main provisions of the safe harbor proposal are as follows: 
(1) The Initial Development Team intends for the network on which the token functions to reach 
Network Maturity, as defined herein, within three years of the date of the first sale of tokens and will 
undertake good faith and reasonable efforts to achieve such status; 
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 The idea underlying the proposal is to “give new projects some breathing 
room where they can do their work without fear of being fined, arrested or hav-
ing their offices raided.”118 This also filters “out the bogus projects that have no 
intention of building a workable, decentralized product.”119 Peirce appears to be 
seeking a way to protect consumers from unscrupulous token issuers while al-
lowing companies to move forward with technical developments.  
 Many members of the blockchain industry welcomed the safe harbor pro-
posal. The General Counsel for a cryptocurrency exchange declared, “Today we 
both congratulate and thank SEC Commissioner Hester Peirce . . . . This is a 
great day for the blockchain industry and the United States.”120 But the proposed 
safe harbor is just that: a proposal. It is not yet law, and may never become 
law.121 Even so, the willingness of Commissioner Peirce to think outside of the 
box with this proposal has reinforced her reputation (and her nickname) within 
the blockchain community.  
2. The Federal Reserve’s Digital Dollar 
 The Federal Reserve revealed in February 2020 that it was working toward 
a potential central bank digital currency (CBDC).122 A CBDC, colloquially 
                                                                                                                               
(2) Disclosures required under paragraph (b) of this section must be made available on a freely ac-
cessible public website. 
(3) The token must be offered and sold for the purpose of facilitating access to, participation on, or 
the development of the network. 
(4) The Initial Development Team intends to and will undertake good faith and reasonable efforts to 
create liquidity for users. If the Initial Development Team attempts to secure secondary trading of the 
token on a trading platform, it will seek secondary trading platforms that can demonstrate compliance 
with all applicable federal and state law and regulations relating to money transmission, anti-money 
laundering, and consumer protection. 
(5) The Initial Development Team files a notice of reliance in accordance with paragraph (c) of this 
section. 
Id. 
 118. Sergey Goluveb, SEC Safe Harbor for Crypto—Maybe Story, MEDIUM (Mar. 24, 2020), 
https://medium.com/the-capital/sec-safe-harbor-for-crypto-maybe-story-b9f7512c829e [https://perma. 
cc/MB8U-B3MW]. 
 119. Id. As this Article goes to press, it remains to be seen how President Joseph Biden’s 
choices to lead the SEC and other agencies will affect cryptocurrency regulations. 
 120. Georgia Quinn, Crypto’s Safe Harbor: How the SEC’s Rule 195 Could Change the 
Industry, MEDIUM (Feb. 6, 2020), https://medium.com/coinlist/cryptos-safe-harbor-how-the-sec-s-
rule-195-could-change-the-industry-6c1878af266d [https://perma.cc/J4FB-D66A]. 
 121. See Bruce Fenton, The SEC Blockchain Safe Harbor Proposal, MEDIUM (Feb. 6, 2020), 
https://medium.com/@brucefenton/the-sec-blockchain-safe-harbor-proposal-cbeb66ce272a [https:// 
perma.cc/XZ2H-Q4RN] (“I don’t think it is workable or will pass and overall seems to be a mis-
guided, while well intentioned, effort.”). 
 122. Lael Brainard, Governor, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., The Digitalization 
of Payments and Currency: Some Issues for Consideration (Feb. 5, 2020), https://www.federal 
reserve.gov/newsevents/speech/brainard20200205a.htm [https://perma.cc/DL6K-VLSQ]. There are 
others working on this project: three former CFTC officials created the “Digital Dollar Foundation” 
to create potential designs and proposals. The Foundation partnered with Accenture to form the 
“Digital Dollar Project,” intending to “encourage research and public discussion on the potential 
advantages of a digital dollar, convene private sector thought leaders and actors, and propose possi-
ble models to support the public sector.” Leading the Discussion on a U.S. Central Bank Digital 
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known as a “digital dollar,” is not a token based on a decentralized block-
chain.123 It would instead be a “debt notation on a centralized ledger maintained 
by the Federal Reserve,” which would use a centralized database to track con-
sumer or business balances.124 Individuals could “access funds through digital 
dollar wallets, which would also be managed by the Fed.”125  
 Although the digital dollar is different from a crypto asset on a blockchain, 
the policy issues at hand are quite similar. The Federal Reserve recognizes that 
these policies include financial stability and legal considerations, such as pri-
vacy concerns and protections for data and digital identity safety. However, the 
Federal Reserve clearly wishes to be on the cutting edge of the digital dollar 
debate, with one of its members noting that “it is essential that we remain on the 
frontier of research and policy development regarding CBDC.”126  
 At the time, there was pressure on the Federal Reserve to begin researching 
a digital dollar. China is creating a digital yuan,127 and some argue that the 
United States is already “falling behind” other countries in developing a 
CBDC.128 In addition, the surprise release of Facebook’s Libra in 2019 (now 
rebranded as “Diem”) apparently inspired the Federal Reserve to accelerate its 
research on the potential of a CBDC.129 The arrival of the COVID-19 pandemic 
expedited the discussion, as millions of people around the world moved toward 
cashless payments.130  
 The discussion of a digital dollar jumped quickly during the pandemic from 
the Federal Reserve to Congress. Drafts of congressional emergency pandemic 
relief legislation in March 2020 included a digital dollar concept to speed up the 
delivery of stimulus payments.131 A Congressional Task Force on Financial 
                                                                                                                               
Currency, DIGITAL DOLLAR PROJECT, https://www.digitaldollarproject.org/ [https://perma.cc/DTJ7 
-PRM3]). 
 123. Meena Thiruvengadam, How the COVID-19 Crisis Revived the Digital Dollar Debate, 
COINDESK (May 8, 2020, 2:00P.M.), https://www.coindesk.com/coronavirus-what-is-digital-dollar 
-cbdc-explainer [https://perma.cc/3SL6-2PMX]. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Brainard, supra note 122. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Mohammad Musharraf, US Lags Behind Other Nations Regarding CBDCs, Says Former 
CFTC Commissioner, COINTELEGRAPH (July 22, 2020), https://cointelegraph.com/news/us-lags-be 
hind-other-nations-regarding-cbdcs-says-former-cftc-commissioner [https://perma.cc/2FCP-ANZT]. 
Sheila Warren, Head of Blockchain, Data, and Digital Assets at the World Economic Forum, noted 
that “developing nations are able to more easily experiment with a CBDC because they are exploring 
use cases on a domestic level,” and are not “setting the table for the entire global economy.” Id.  
 129. Brainard, supra note 122 (“[The] Libra global stablecoin project has imparted urgency to 
the debate over what form money can take, who or what can issue it, and how payments can be 
recorded and settled.”) 
 130. Huw Jones, Pandemic Pushes Central Bank Digital Currencies into Top Gear, REUTERS 
(June 11, 2020, 8:53 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-britain-crypto-id 
USKBN23I2HO [https://perma.cc/2YGH-D47D]. 
 131. S. 3571, 116th Congress (2020); see also Jason Brett, Digital Dollar and Digital Wallet 
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Technology held hearings on the issue in June 2020.132 Indeed, “the question 
might be not if digital currencies will find their way into the financial system, 
but when—and how.”133 As federal lawmakers move toward the creation and 
regulation of a CBDC, they should be pondering how to encourage innovation 
while protecting consumers. In addition, anyone involved with the CBDC 
should consider transparency issues involving the input of multiple stakehold-
ers, as well as ethical considerations such as concerns for unbanked populations. 
3. Treasury Department Regulations to Increase Cryptocurrency 
Transparency  
 Unlike SEC Commissioner Hester Peirce and the Federal Reserve, U.S. 
Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin has taken a more cautious (and arguably 
negative) approach to cryptocurrency.134 In February 2020, Secretary Mnuchin 
told the Senate Finance Committee that the Treasury Department would be en-
acting “stricter regulations around digital currencies to help expose ‘secret’ ac-
counts and other nefarious activities.”135 Although Mnuchin acknowledged that 
“[w]e want to make sure that blockchain technology moves forward,” he also 
noted that “[w]e want to make sure cryptocurrencies aren’t used for the equiva-
lent of old Swiss secret number bank accounts.”136 
 The goal of Treasury regulations will be to “ensure law enforcement can 
see where the money is flowing, and that it’s not used for money laundering.”137 
A March 2020 press release from the Treasury Department announced that the 
Department had held a meeting of “industry thought leaders and compliance 
                                                                                                                               
 132. See, e.g., Press Release, Rep. Tom Emmer, FinTech Task Force Holds Virtual Hearing 
on Use of Digital Tools to Increase Financial Inclusion (Jun 12, 2020), https://emmer.house.gov/20 
20/6/fintech-task-force-holds-virtual-hearing-on-use-of-digital-tools-to-increase-financial-inclusion 
[https://perma.cc/3AX6-XP4K]. 
 133. Experts Tell Congress It’s Time to Create a “Digital Dollar,” PYMNTS (June 12, 2020), 
https://www.pymnts.com/digital-payments/2020/experts-tell-congress-create-digital-dollar/ [https:// 
perma.cc/23GF-SCRK]. 
 134. Nathan Whittemore, SEC Commissioner Hester Peirce on a Bitcoin ETF, Custody Rules 
and What’s Next for the SEC, COINDESK (Dec. 10, 2020, 12:40 PM), https://www.coindesk.com/ 
sec-commissioner-hester-peirce-bitcoin-etf [https://perma.cc/BJY6-KGMD]; Kate Rooney, Mnuchin: 
US Has ‘Very Serious Concerns’ that Facebook’s Libra Could Be Misused by Terrorists, CNBC 
(July 15, 2019, 3:08 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/07/15/treasury-secretary-mnuchin-will-hold 
-a-news-conference-on-cryptocurrencies-at-2-pm-et.html [https://perma.cc/FPR4-SWKX]. This is 
likely the result of President Donald Trump’s negative stance toward cryptocurrency. See Donald 
Trump (@realdonaldtrump), TWITTER (July 11, 2019, 5:15 p.m.), https://twitter.com/realdonald 
trump/status/1149472282584072192?lang=en [https://web.archive.org/web/20201004013918/https://twit 
ter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/1149472282584072192?lang=en] (“I am not a fan of Bitcoin and other 
Cryptocurrencies, which are not money, and whose value is highly volatile and based on thin air. 
Unregulated Crypto Assets can facilitate unlawful behavior, including drug trade and other illegal 
activity . . . .”). 
 135. Selva Ozelli, US Takes Regulatory Steps for Blockchain Technology Adoption, 
COINTELEGRAPH (Mar. 17, 2020), https://cointelegraph.com/news/us-takes-regulatory-steps-for-
blockchain-technology-adoption [https://perma.cc/L57P-RZ43]. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
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experts” on the issue of cryptocurrency regulation.138 The press release also ex-
plained that as these regulations develop, Treasury will remain focused on pre-
venting illegal conduct by “money launderers, terrorist financiers, and other bad 
actors.”139 The repeated use of such negative terms indicates the Department’s 
adverse stance toward cryptocurrencies, as well as an example of lawmakers 
and regulators “still cling[ing] to an outdated trope where cryptocurrencies are 
used to underwrite criminal activity.”140 
 What can we make of this patchwork approach to regulation among U.S. 
federal agencies? Some may argue that it is better for the federal government to 
allow the blockchain industry and cryptocurrency markets to evolve before fi-
nalizing a regulatory structure. There can also be benefits to regulatory diver-
gence, such as enhanced innovation as agencies compete to become the 
preferred regulator in a particular field. However, the absence of “intelligent 
rules and regulations that provide a clear and predictable framework for inves-
tors, issuers, and their lawyers” is complicating that evolution.141 How can law-
yers advise clients—such as start-up companies desiring to operate in the 
cryptocurrency sphere or offer tokens to investors—if it is unclear how such 
assets would be regulated? Policymakers are not sufficiently considering im-
portant factors, including transparency and uniformity, under this current ap-
proach. 
 Perhaps the problem is a lack of unity among federal agencies, who appear 
to be tripping over themselves to get in on the digital asset regulatory action. 
Federal policymakers may be concerned that they are not yet educated enough 
to make cohesive decisions about overarching regulatory frameworks, or they 
are waiting for Congress to step up. In any case, this confusion at the federal 
level is wreaking havoc on the blockchain industry in the United States. Inno-
vative companies must risk inadvertently violating regulations (and having to 
pay the ensuing fines) just to push the industry forward.142 Alternatively, com-
panies are choosing to leave the U.S for other jurisdictions with better regulatory 
                                                                                                                               
 138. Press Release, U.S. Treasury Dep’t, Treasury Convenes Cryptocurrency Working 
Session with Industry Leaders (Mar. 2, 2020), https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm926 
[https://perma.cc/GY5Z-QBQR].  
 139. Id. 
 140. Brandi Vincent, Advancing Blockchain Act Calls for Federally-Led Deep-Dive Into the 
Nascent Tech, NEXTGOV (May 29, 2020), https://www.nextgov.com/emerging-tech/2020/05/advan 
cing-blockchain-act-calls-federally-led-deep-dive-nascent-tech/165775/ [https://perma.cc/3E74-EEQY]. 
 141. Henderson & Raskin, supra note 48, at 445. 
 142. Ripple’s CTO noted in June 2019 that the SEC “had settled into a pattern of regulation 
through enforcement,” rather than providing clear regulations for the industry to follow. SEC 
Leaving Cryptos in an ‘Awkward’ Place, Ripple Exec Says, LAW360 (June 12, 2019), https://www. 
law360.com/articles/1168484/sec-leaving-cryptos-in-an-awkward-place-ripple-exec-says [https:// 
perma.cc/Y4PC-5VCE]; see also Park & Park, supra note 13, at 99 (discussing “regulation by se-
lective enforcement” in the context of ICOs). 
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clarity.143 Piecemeal regulation among federal agencies is “not a substitute for 
transparent legislation or judicial rulings to guide market participants.”144 
B. A Case Study of Legislative Failure: The Cryptocurrency Act  
of 2020 
 So where is Congress on this issue? The inability of federal legislators to 
create a comprehensive regulatory structure for blockchain technology’s appli-
cations is not for lack of effort. For example, the Token Taxonomy Act, which 
was reintroduced in 2019, sought to amend the securities laws to exclude digital 
tokens.145 The bill has been stuck in committee for over a year.146 The Block-
chain Records and Transactions Act of 2018, reintroduced in 2020, would pro-
vide uniform standards regarding the “legal effect, validity and enforceability” 
of blockchain-based records.147 
 In addition, the Advancing Blockchain Act was introduced in June 2020 as 
part of a wider package148 of technology-related bills. This Act, if passed, would 
direct the Department of Commerce and the Federal Trade Commission to study 
blockchain in various industries.149 The Act also requires the drafting of a report 
to Congress recommending ways to develop a “comprehensive plan” and “na-
tional strategy” for the promotion and adoption of blockchain.150 In late 2020, 
Congressional members introduced the Digital Commodity Exchange Act151 
and the (ironically titled) Securities Clarity Act;152 both acts are intended to pro-
vide better frameworks for the regulation of digital assets. 
 But it is the Cryptocurrency Act of 2020 that provides a clear illustration of 
the pitfalls awaiting lawmakers as they try to legislate new technologies. The 
original version of the Cryptocurrency Act of 2020, introduced by Rep. Paul 
Gosar (R-Ariz), was leaked in December 2019. The industry debate over its pro-
visions began early. Rep. Gosar officially introduced a revised version in March 
2020, with the hope that it would provide regulatory clarity to cryptocurren-
cies.153 In reality, the bill does nothing to properly clarify the regulation of dig-
ital assets, and actually raises at least three problematic issues. 
 
                                                                                                                               
 143. Jeff Kauflin, Crypto Startups Are Fleeing the U.S.—This Bill Is Trying to Stop Them, 
FORBES (Jan. 10, 2019, 12:25 P.M.), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jeffkauflin/2019/01/10/crypto-st 
artups-are-fleeing-the-usthis-bill-is-trying-to-stop-them/#c638fab2267a [https://perma.cc/FJ6D-EFAG]. 
 144. Recent Guidance, supra note 43, at 2425. 
 145. H.R. 2144, 116th Congress (2019). The bill also had some tax implications. 
 146. Id.  
 147. H.R. 8524, 116th Congress (2020).  
 148. Vincent, supra note 140. 
 149. H.R. 6938, 116th Congress (2020). 
 150. Id. The bill allows two years for the drafting of the report, with the effect that “permitting 
the FTC to spend two years studying blockchain before making any recommendations puts us an-
other two years behind other countries.” Vincent, supra note 140. 
 151. H.R. 8373, 116th Congress (2020).  
 152. H.R. 8378, 116th Congress (2020). 
 153. Kuhn, supra note 67. 
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 The bill divides digital assets into three different categories:  
1) Crypto-commodity: “economic goods or services, including derivatives” 
with fungible value that “rest on a blockchain”;154 
2) Crypto-currency: “representatives of United States currency or synthetic de-
rivatives on a blockchain”;155 
3) Crypto-security: “debt and equity on a blockchain,” excluding money ser-
vice businesses;156  
 The bill then identifies three federal agencies as “Primary Federal Digital 
Asset Regulators,” giving specific jurisdiction to each agency as the sole primary 
regulatory depending on the type of digital asset at issue. The CFTC would reg-
ulate crypto-commodities, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) 
would regulate cryptocurrencies, and the SEC would regulate crypto-securities.  
 The first issue with the bill is its lack of regulatory flexibility, which shows 
that the authors of this bill did not fully consider the balance between promoting 
innovation and protecting the public. What if an issue related to a cryptocur-
rency, for example, should fall within an area traditionally regulated by the SEC 
instead of FinCEN? If a crypto-commodity could be used as a currency, how 
should it be regulated? What about tax liability concerns, which are conspicu-
ously absent from this bill? Given the swift pace of change in this industry, what 
would federal regulators do with a new type of digital asset that doesn’t fall 
within these neat lines? Industry players will not wait around to find out, but 
will instead move to other jurisdictions.  
 This bill does not account for the fast-moving nature of this industry. Nor 
does it fully recognize the jurisdictional boundaries of these agencies.157 It is 
true that classifying digital assets based on their characteristics could create a 
well-ordered regulatory framework, but digital assets are evolving too quickly 
for legislators to do this without some form of liaison between agencies.158 For 
example, Congress or the White House could create a new Division of Emerging 
Technologies with ties to all of these regulatory bodies (much like California’s 
new Office of Digital Innovation).159 This new Division could sit within the cur-
                                                                                                                               
 154. H.R. 6154, 116th Congress (2020). 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. The bill also defines the terms “smart contracts,” “reserve-backed stablecoin,” and 
“synthetic stablecoin.” Id. 
 157. Robert Kim, A Crypto-Currency Act of 2020? You Cannot Be Serious!, BLOOMBERG 
LAW (Jan. 13, 2020, 3:38 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/bloomberg-law-analysis/analysis-
a-crypto-currency-act-of-2020-you-cannot-be-serious [https://perma.cc/K5XK-PYVB]. 
 158. Some would argue that even classifying digital assets at all is impossible: “It seems a 
common belief that digital assets can only fit a single category under US law—in other words, that they 
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That’s wrong. Digital assets can be, and likely are, many of these at once.” Drake, supra note 97.  
 159. California’s Office of Digital Innovation “is a start-up inside state government focused 
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rent Office of Science and Technology Policy and act as an official liaison, ad-
vising legislators about how proposed legislation falls within the jurisdiction of 
various agencies.  
 A second issue with the Cryptocurrency Act of 2020 is a provision allowing 
the government to trace cryptocurrency transactions: 
[T]he Secretary of the Treasury, acting through the Financial Crimes Enforce-
ment Network, shall issue rules to require each crypto-currency (including 
synthetic stablecoins) to allow for the tracing of transactions in the crypto-
currency and persons engaging in such transactions in a manner similar to that 
required of financial institutions with respect to currency transactions . . . .160  
The purpose of this provision is ostensibly to enable a more effective fight 
against illegal uses of cryptocurrency, such as money laundering. This is not a 
new idea, since similar schemes already exist for fiat transactions. But by allow-
ing the government to trace transactions, this bill takes away the psuedonymity 
of cryptocurrency. 
 Consequently, this provision has numerous privacy implications. Indeed, 
privacy advocates are very concerned about the consequences if this bill were 
to pass. For example, the Human Rights Foundation’s Alex Gladstein tweeted, 
“Beware of the ‘Crypto-Currency Act of 2020’ or any kind of legislation which 
may force businesses to spy on, deanonymize, or micro-monitor customers. This 
is an attack on financial privacy, which we will desperately need in the future to 
safeguard democratic rights and freedoms.”161 Others would argue that there is 
no need to protect the pseudonymity of cryptocurrency. Most fiat currency 
transactions (other than cash) are de-anonymized through know your customer 
and anti-money laundering regulations; why should cryptocurrency be treated 
differently?162 In any event, Congress should be ready for a major privacy up-
roar if this bill moves closer to passing. 
 Moreover, other questions will arise if a law like this were to pass. Should 
system developers be compelled by the law to adapt their systems to the law? 
What would happen if developers did not comply? How much system design 
can or should be compelled by regulatory compliance?  
 The Cryptocurrency Act of 2020 is undoubtedly too broad and too vague. 
But some argue that the bill is not needed at all. As Professor Donna Redel stated 
while discussing the Act, “The optimum way to regulate the industry would be 
for the agencies to come up with a robust set of rules.”163 If the agencies listed 
in the Cryptocurrency Act of 2020 could work together to create a cohesive 
framework, Congress could step back and let regulatory clarity emerge. This has 
the added bonus of taking at least some politics (or politicians) out of blockchain 
                                                                                                                               
 160. H.R. 6154, 116th Congress (2020).  
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regulatory drafting. However, as discussed above, federal agencies are a long 
way from a cohesive approach to digital assets. 
 This bill also demonstrates that federal lawmakers are writing cryptocur-
rency laws in the dark, with the outcome dependent upon whomever they speak 
with in the industry. Rep. Gosar was advised by two cryptocurrency millionaires 
in their early twenties, prompting one reporter to note that “[t]he innocence and 
youth sitting around the table that was developing Federal legislation was strik-
ing.”164 There was no Working Group or other collaboration of various perspec-
tives involved in the drafting of this bill, which epitomizes the lack of diverse 
viewpoints (and the lack of transparency) in federal lawmaking.165  
 Lobbying is always present in Congress, and marginalized voices have less 
access to legislators than those with resources. But the inclusion of different 
voices and viewpoints is critical to fair legislation, and also “should lead to more 
fulsome analyses by regulators.”166 The blockchain industry, together with fed-
eral lawmakers, must consider multiple perspectives when drafting bills relating 
to blockchain.167 How else can the industry make sure that those who are speak-
ing to Congress represent diverse and ethical viewpoints?  
 It is too late for the Cryptocurrency Act of 2020, which has already been 
declared “dead on arrival.”168 But blockchain advocates, opponents, and mem-
bers of the industry should be paying attention when bills like this are being 
drafted. If for no other reason, this could avoid wasting federal resources on a 
bill that won’t resolve our regulatory uncertainty. In the alternative, federal law-
makers could look to the states for guidance, as state legislatures are adopting a 
variety of approaches to the regulation of blockchain technology. 
IV. THREE STATE APPROACHES: CALIFORNIA, 
WYOMING, AND NEW YORK 
 Three of the most important states in the context of regulating blockchain 
use cases are California, Wyoming, and New York. To understand their differ-
ences, one could consider Aesop’s fable “The Hare and the Tortoise.”169 In the 
                                                                                                                               
 164. Jason Brett, U.S. Blockchain Entrepreneurs Support Crypto-Currency Act of 2020 
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fable, the hare and the tortoise agreed to a race. The hare ran so quickly that he 
was soon out of sight of the tortoise, and he decided to settle down for a nap 
while he waited for the tortoise to catch up. The tortoise plowed slowly ahead, 
passing the sleeping hare, and eventually crossed the finish line ahead of the 
tortoise. 
 This fable offers an analogy to state blockchain regulation. California is 
taking an intentionally slower and deliberative approach to blockchain regula-
tion, earning the title of the “tortoise.” Wyoming has jumped quickly to the front 
of the line by passing numerous blockchain laws quickly, just as the “hare” ran 
ahead in the race. New York is an outlier in the fable, but could be seen as a 
“boomerang” for its decision to rapidly move forward with the creation of the 
BitLicense, and then swing the blockchain regulatory pendulum back again. 
A. California (the “Tortoise Approach”) 
 California has the largest population in the United States, and is the world’s 
“fifth-largest economy.”170 With many stakeholders affected by blockchain reg-
ulation, California is taking a more deliberate approach than some other states 
(the “tortoise” approach). California lawmakers passed Assembly Bill 2658 in 
2018, establishing a Blockchain Working Group.171 The Group was charged 
with defining the term “blockchain,” evaluating blockchain “uses, risks, bene-
fits, legal implications and best practices,” and recommending amendments to 
other state statutes that would be affected by “the deployment of blockchain.”172 
 The Working Group, convened in August 2018, had 20 members represent-
ing diverse disciplines, including “technology, business, government, law, [and 
both] public and private information security.”173 This independent body also 
considered input from a wide variety of stakeholders, as members of the public 
from academia, industry, and other areas attended the public meetings or pro-
vided comments in written form.174 
 As the Working Group gathered and considered input, the members divided 
up topics for research and drafting. These topics included blockchain’s implica-
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tions on finance and banking implications, civic participation, utilities and nat-
ural resources, and supply chains.175 As discussed in Section II.B, this group 
also drafted the first ethical considerations for blockchain regulation. In addi-
tion, the group discussed and adopted a framework for assessing the fitness of 
blockchain for use cases.176 This “thoughtful, evidence-based” method was in-
tended to create “new frameworks for implementing an emerging technology 
with potentially wide-ranging impact.”177 For example, as noted in Section II.B 
above, the ethical framework created by the Working Group was the first of its 
kind among U.S. states.  
 The Working Group recognized the tension between protecting Californi-
ans and avoiding the loss of blockchain business to interjurisdictional competi-
tion, working accordingly with the input of multiple stakeholders from across 
the state. In this way, California lawmakers will have already determined policy 
decisions before drafting a comprehensive regulatory scheme. In the words of 
Assembly Majority Leader Ian Calderon, who sponsored the legislation creating 
the Working Group, California’s lawmakers will be able to “learn from the mis-
takes made from other states that have drafted legislation for blockchain and 
make well informed decisions to come up with legislation that works best for 
California.”178 This may also allow California to emerge as a leading model in 
blockchain regulation; as Professor Angela Walch notes, legislative bodies that 
can critically think about this new technology in an educated way may end up 
“helping to create the set of facts about the technology.”179 
 The Working Group also provided a way to educate legislators about block-
chain’s potential; it is a rare gift in the blockchain industry to have a 169-page 
report by multiple stakeholders that summarizes both the technology and the use 
cases relevant to a particular jurisdiction.180 Moreover, any legislation ulti-
mately drafted will likely have more buy-in from members of the public. 
 There are, of course, disadvantages to California’s slow method of lawmak-
ing. Although the Working Group drafted a report in record time from the per-
spective of a legislative body, California certainly lost valuable time as 
blockchain companies chose to move to states (or foreign jurisdictions) with 
more developed regulatory structures.181 In addition, the Working Group’s re-
port is only the beginning of the story; any bill based on the Working Group 
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report must move through the legislative process before becoming law.182 As-
sembly Majority Leader Calderon noted that “[t]he earliest possible implemen-
tation date on blockchain related policy would be January 1, 2022 at this rate, 
which is a huge concern because there will already be a lot of movement hap-
pening in the space.”183 Despite this cost, California’s measured approach to 
blockchain legislation may lead to a more balanced and successful legislative 
scheme in the long run.  
B. Wyoming (the “Hare” Approach) 
 Wyoming, America’s least populous state, is a small and nimble jurisdic-
tion.184 Its state legislators realized that it could be “good for Wyoming that the 
federal government has been proving its stripes of incompetency” in the context 
of blockchain regulation.185 Wyoming jumped ahead of the pack by drafting 
some of the first and most permissive laws regulating blockchain and crypto-
currency in the United States (the “hare” approach). Indeed, Wyoming’s pace 
of lawmaking is truly impressive, as the state legislature famously enacted 
thirteen crypto-friendly laws in 2019. 
 Wyoming’s state legislature and blockchain advocates made the calculation 
that the state could become a “crypto haven”186 by passing permissive legisla-
tion early and often. Wyoming does not tax cryptocurrency,187 and recognizes 
property rights for digital assets.188 
 Wyoming has even created Special Purpose Depository Institutions 
(SPDIs), a new type of fully reserved fiat bank that can also custody crypto 
assets.189 This bank is proving to be a way of getting around New York’s re-
strictive BitLicense (described in Section IV.C below), because these SPDIs can 
operate in New York without a BitLicense.190 
 Wyoming’s approach has proven to be good for business. The laws passed 
there are designed to be favorable to cryptocurrency companies and investors, 
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and the state is working to attract blockchain companies.191 Wyoming’s hope is 
that these companies will “offer more than a $100 filing fee and a PO box in 
Cheyenne,” but will also bring employment and innovation opportunities to 
residents of Wyoming.192  
 Other states have noticed Wyoming’s early success with the hare approach 
and are following suit, passing similarly permissive laws in a bid to attract 
blockchain businesses to their states.193 The President of the recently formed 
Texas Blockchain Council was candid in July 2020 about his state’s interest in 
following Wyoming: 
What states like Wyoming have done for blockchain innovation is truly amaz-
ing and we certainly want to emulate that. We just want to come behind these 
states with Texas’ trillion-dollar economy, which will ultimately allow us to 
become the next big place where blockchain innovation happens.194 
 But there is a risk to this method, since courts may end up clogged with 
litigation based on issues that a speedy legislature was not able to contemplate 
in advance. In addition, a large state like Texas may not be able to modify its 
legislation to changes in technology as quickly as a small state like Wyoming. 
Passing hastily drafted legislation also raises questions of transparency, since 
there may not be time to consider the perspectives of diverse stakeholders. 
Whether Wyoming’s hare approach will ultimately prove to be more successful 
than California’s tortoise approach remains to be seen, especially as these new 
laws wind their way through litigation and are ultimately tested in state (and 
potentially federal) courts.  
C. New York (the “Boomerang Approach”) 
 New York, always a leader in the world of financial services, adopted a 
very restrictive approach to regulating blockchain’s first and most advanced use 
case: virtual currencies. In 2015, the New York Department of Financial Ser-
vices created a “BitLicense,” designed for the purpose of regulating virtual cur-
rency business for New York residents and customers.195 Any company seeking 
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to sell cryptocurrency in New York is required to secure a BitLicense to do so.196 
BitLicenses also require companies to disclose detailed information about com-
pany operations, including know your customer requirements.197 
 The BitLicense is not only the most “rigorous” regulatory scheme in the 
United States, but it is also notoriously difficult to acquire this license.198 Only 
twenty-five licenses have been issued in the five years that the BitLicense has 
been active.199 Numerous companies declared soon after the enactment of the 
BitLicense that they were no longer going to transact business in New York,200 
prompting complaints that the BitLicense was deterring innovation.201 This 
“Great Bitcoin Exodus”202 has continued to have ramifications in New York, as 
other states (such as Wyoming) are attracting blockchain and crypto companies 
with their less restrictive regulations. 
 In light of New York’s declining position in the interjurisdictional race for 
blockchain business, there are indications that some of these restrictions might 
soon become more relaxed. In late June 2020, New York’s Department of Fi-
nancial Services announced that it would create a “conditional license” that al-
lows companies to conduct virtual currency business in New York, if they agree 
to “collaborate and engage” with an “an authorized VC [“Virtual Currency”] 
Entity for various services and support.”203 The State University of New York 
(SUNY) system will create an authorized VC entity for this purpose, meaning 
that companies can experiment with virtual currency under university supervi-
sion through the new SUNY BLOCK program.204 
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 This is a creative collaboration between a state agency and its state univer-
sity system, and it will be interesting to observe how this program evolves. New 
York is effectively employing a “boomerang” approach: they started with the 
most restrictive regulations in the country, and now may be returning back to a 
middle ground approach. In any case, there is no mistaking the reason for New 
York’s decision to ease BitLicense requirements: NYDFS Superintendent Linda 
Lacewell stated outright on Twitter that “We want innovators across the board 
to come to NY. #NewYork is the capital of finance and #Innovation, & we want 
innovators right here in #NY which has been a place of invention and ingenu-
ity.”205 Will New York catch up in the interjurisdictional race for blockchain 
and cryptocurrency business? The answer is not yet clear, but legislators across 
the country should keep an eye on these developments as they create their own 
regulatory schemes. 
 
 If nothing else, states and the federal government have demonstrated that 
there are various ways to regulate crypto and blockchain businesses in the 
United States.206 Federal agencies are taking different, and sometimes conflict-
ing, viewpoints toward the regulation of cryptocurrency and digital assets. Con-
gress’ attempts to provide an overarching regulatory scheme, such as the 
Cryptocurrency Act of 2020, have so far been ineffective. 
 Lawmakers could look to the states for guidance, especially the three dis-
tinct legislative approaches of California, Wyoming and New York. Each of 
these methods has benefits and disadvantages, and it is not yet clear which ap-
proach will be the most successful in the long term.207 The race is not always 
won by the swift,208 but delayed legislative efforts risk losing the interjurisdic-
tional competition for blockchain business. Lawmakers should also consider the 
five factors recommended in this Article, as deliberate contemplation of each of 
these factors will result in stronger blockchain-related legislation.  
 Blockchain technology and its applications will continue developing 
quickly, regardless of how governments frame regulation. Everyone—including 
industry players, members of the public, and governments themselves—will 
benefit if lawmakers can strike the right balance between innovation and public 
protection. 
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